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Abstract
In this paper a dynamic surface is derived from a consumer
intertemporal utility maximization problem. The monopolistic firm uses
this dynamic demand surface to formulate its optimal price, production,
and inventory policy.
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I. Introduction
In a good deal of the dynamic economics which is devoted to
analyzing supply issues; e.g., extraction of renewable or nonrenewable
resources, inventory investment, and investment in quasi-fixed factors
of production, it is assumed that the demand curve is stationary. An
implication of this assumption is that buyers are more naive than sell-
ers with regard to future opportunities. Often it is concomitantly
assumed that sellers have some discretion with regard to product price.
One would like to know if the nature of the firm's decision hinges
crucially on the assumption of asymmetry in sophistication.
Leon Moses and I [ ] have shown that a monopolistic firm with
u-shaped production costs, an inventory capability, and a stationary
demand curve whose marginal revenue curve intersects marginal cost to
the left of minimum average cost, will hold product inventory and price
the product in a cyclical fashion that depends on inventory level. We
are confident that our model reflects a realistic way in which product
inventories can be used to take advantage of efficiences in production.
However, both of us are unsatisfied with the conclusions about product
price. This paper presents an extension of our earlier model. It is
an attempt to move towards realism by allowing demand to be derived
from a dynamic consumer maximization problem. In this formulation,
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the quantity demanded at one point in time depends not only on current
product price, but also on prices at other times.
II. The Model
First, we consider the problem of the consumer. This is a non-
stochastic, infinite horizon problem. Let 6 be the consumer's rate of
time preference and other relevant variables are
:
x(t) , consumption of the monopolist's product at t;
m(t) , consumption of the numeraire at t;
M(t), stock holdings of the numeraire at t;
m, income flow of the numeraire;
p(t), numeraire price of the monopolist's product at t;
r, market interest rate;
u(x,m) , flow utility when consumption of the monopolist's product
is x and numeraire consumption is m.
We assume that u is strictly concave, increasing, and
u (0,m) = u (x,0) = «.
x m
The consumer's problem is:
f°°
(1) Maximize e"6t u(x(t) ,m(t))dt
x( ), m( ) J
subject to:
(2) M(t) = rM(t) +m - p(t)x(t) - m(t)
.
(3) x(t), m(t) >_0, M(t) >_- | for all t.
Also assume that numeraire stocks are initially zero.
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(4) M(0) = 0.
Note : It is assumed that the consumer can't hoard the monopolist's
product. This restriction is unimportant for our purposes. If the
consumer had such an ability, the rate at which the monopolist could
raise price would be limited by the consumer's hoarding cost. In the
presence of such an ability the consumer hoards at an infinite rate
when the monopolist raises price too quickly, i.e., there will be jumps
in the consumer's stock holdings.
To solve the consumer's problem form the Hamiltonian:
(5) H = e~
6t
u(x(t),m(t)) + X(t) [rM(t)+m"-p(t)x(t)-m(t)]
+ n(t)[M(t)+|] + 5
1
(t)x(t) + C2 (t)m(t).
The first order conditions are:
(6)
i
|S_=e-6tu
x
-X(t) P (t) +Sl (t) =0.
(7) 3mfo =e
"6tu
m- X(t)+ S 2 (t) = ° ;
(8) 3^7 = "*<*) = X ( c > r + n < t >-
There are also complementary slackness conditions. However, by
the assumptions on the partial derivatives of u at the zero consumption
level, and assuming that price is bounded and bounded away from zero,
it will never be optimal to set the controls to zero. Consequently,
numeraire stock will not reach its lower bound in finite time. Thus,
(8) can be solved to yield:
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(9) A(t) = ke , k is a constant -of integration.
This solution can be used to implicitly solve for x(t) and m(t)
by substituting back into (5) and (6). We get:
(10) u„ = ke
(5"r)t
p(t).
m-m , (<5-r)t(11) u = ke .
tn
This yields controls of the form: x(t) x(k,t,p(t)) and
m(t) m(k,t,p(t)). The constant k is chosen so that the lifetime
budget constraint is satisfied.
(12) ! e"
rt [p(t)x(k,t,p(t)) + m(k,t,p(t))-m]dt = 0.
From here on we restrict attention to the case <5 r. By examining
(10) and (11) , it is apparent that in this case we can write the con-
trols as: x(t) = x(k,p(t)) and m(t) = m(k,p(t)).
Now we examine the firm's problem. This is also a nonstochastic
infinite horizon problem. However, it is not a control problem, at
least not in the usual state space, because the monopolist recognizes
that the controls (prices) at later times can influence states (demands)
at earlier times. The monopolist's problem has an element of reverse
causality. To present this problem we need to introduce a few more
variables. These are:
y(t) , sales at t;
q(t), production at t;
C(q(t)), production costs at production rate q(t) ;
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I(t), inventory stocks at t;
s, unit inventory cost.
We assume that average production cost is u-shaped. We also assume
that if the consumer could not transfer wealth across time, i.e., the
instantaneous budget constraint p(t)x(t) + m(t) = m was satisfied, then
the instantaneous marginal revenue curve derived from the consumer's
problem would intersect marginal production cost to the left of minimum,
average production cost. This condition is necessary for inventory
accumulation to be optimal. If the consumer satisfied this budget con-
straint at each point in time then the resulting demand curve would be
stationary. The firm's problem is:
(13) Maximize
P( ), q( ) J
CO
e"
rt [p(t)y(p,t)-C(q(t))-sI(t)]dt
subject to:
(14) I(t) = q(t) - y(p,t).
(15) p(t), q(t), and I(t) >_ for all t.
Also assume inventory stocks are initially zero.
(16) 1(0) = 0.
Note : In this formulation, sales at time t depend on the entire price
path, p, and not just price at t, p(t).
As formulated, the computation of the firm's optimal policy is a
difficult matter. However, using the solution to the consumer's prob-
lem, the firm's problem can be reformulated as a control problem by
embedding the solution of the consumer's problem into the firm's prob-
lem. This is done by replacing (13) with
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(13') Maximize
! e""
rt [p(t)x(k,p(t)) - C(q(t)) - sl(t)]dt,
P( ), q( ), k JO
by replacing (14) with
(14») I(t) - q(t) - x(k,p(t)),
and by adding another state variable, M(t) , to the firm's problem whose
path of motion is given by
(17) M(t) = rM(t) + m - p(t)x(k,p(t)) - m(t)
,
and which is constrained by
(18) M(t) > - |, M(0) = 0.
We view the firm's problem as the system (13'), (14'), (15), (16,) (17),
and (18).
We must make certain that a solution to the monopolist's problem
exists and that in solving this problem the solution to the consumer's
problem is also generated. To this end we assume that the "demand
curve" x(k, ) is elastic over its entire range and that the monopolist's
product is a normal good for the utility function u. For what is done
later we will also need to assume that the numeraire is a normal good
for the utility function u.
Note that if k was given exogenously and if the present value
version of (18) was not binding asymptotically, i.e., if the consumer
doesn't exhaust his numeraire stock, then the firm's problem, as spec-
ified, would be the one where the firm faces a stationary demand curve.
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To solve the firm's problem, form the Hamiltonian
(19) H = e"
rt [p(t)x(k,p(t)) - C(q(t)) - sl(t)] + X^t) [q(t)-x(k,p(t)) ]
+ X2
(t)[rM(t) +m - p(t)x(k,p(t)) - m(k,p(t))l + n
L
(t)I(t)
+ n
2
(t)[M(t) +^1 + C1 (t)p(t) + S2 (t)q(t).
The first order conditions are:
(20)
aqTtT
= "e
"
rtc
q
+ x
i
(t) +c2 (t)
=0
-
(21) ^|y= e"rt [x(k,p(t)) + p(t)xp ] - X^Ox
- X
2
(t)[x(k,p(t)) + p(t)x + mJ + 5
x
(t)
(22) Jr^T* -\ (t) = "e
"
rts + n
l
(t) *
3H •
(23) WtT = -x2 (t) = V t)r + V c) -
There are also complementary slackness conditions and a condition
determining the optimal k. However, we know that inventory will be
accumulated and that numeraire stock will not be exhausted in finite
time. Hence (22) and (23) can be solved to yield:
(24) X. (t) = c. - 2- e"
rt
and
1 1 r
(25) X
2
(t) = c
2
e"
rt
where c^ and c
2
are constants of integration. Since X (t) and X_(t)
have the interpretation of discounted marginal values of the associated
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stock at t, we can conclude that c. >_ — and that <_ c» < 1. The
latter conclusion follows from the fact that both the monopolist's
product and the numeraire good are normal. Substituting the solution
in (24) back into (20) we get:
(26) C
q
= Cle
rt
- f .
This equation is the same as the optimal production equation in the
stationary demand case. We summarize the production results which were
obtained in the earlier paper. As inventory is accumulated, production
increases to take greater advantage of production efficiences. When
minimum average cost is attained, production ceases and inventory is
decumulated. When inventory stocks reach the zero level, production
resumes. Note that at the time inventory is exhausted there will be a
discontinuity in the Lagrange multiplier X- (t) . This corresponds to a
point of non-differentiability of the inventory state variable.
Our main interest is the optimal price path. Assuming it is never
rt
optimal to price at zero, we multiply (21) by to get:X
P
(27)
x(k, P (t)) + p(t) = « _ j [*PyW + p( t ) + i]
p p p
or:
r
rt s
l.
m i[c
l
e
~ r
C
2 -&
(28) «Cfc,P<t» + p(t) . !p_
P 2
The first thing that can be concluded is that it is not optimal for the
firm to hold price constant. If price were held constant, all terms in
r t
(28) except c. e would not vary. Hence, the equality in (28) could
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not be maintained. Saving behavior and intertemporal substitution by
the consumer cannot completely offset the monopolist's desire to price
discriminate across time.
The left hand side of (28) is the marginal revenue for the demand
curve x(k, ) at the price p(t). If there is a unique differentiable p( )
which solves (28), then by differentiating (28) with respect to t one
can see that the price path must be monotonic over the inventory
accumulation-decumulation cycle. This follows since all terms except
the exponential term will include the time derivative of price. Hence,
this derivative can't be zero for the price path that solves (28). It
should be noted that for uniqueness and differentiability of the price
path some additional conditions must be made on the third derivates of
preferences and consequently on the resulting demand curve. In our
earlier paper, Moses and I made the normal assumption that the marginal
revenue curve is downward sloping. Here, that condition is not enough
to guarantee uniqueness of the solution to (28). However, if it is
also assumed that total expenditure of the consumer, including the
numeraire good, decreases with price, then the optimal price path will
be monotonic increasing. This case gives a qualitatively similar policy
to the stationary demand case.
III. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper it was shown that a solution to the dynamic pricing
problem of a monopolistic firm could be attained by embedding the solu-
tion of the consumer demand problem into the objective and constraints
of the firm. It was shown that as long as the firm finds it optimal to
hold some product inventory it is not optimal for the firm to keep price
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constant. Under certain additional conditions regarding consumer
preference, the optimal price policy of the firm is similar to the
price policy in the static demand curve case.
A deficiency of this model is that the consumer does not acknowledge
the consequence of his behavior on the observed prices. The price
taking assumption rules out the possibility that the consumer feels he
can deter price change by threatening to reduce demand when the mono-
polist raises price. Such a gaming situation is a natural avenue for
further work in this area.
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